Greece in the New Millennium

 

His Excellency

George Savvaides

Ambassador of Greece to the United States

 

4 March, 2004

 

I wish to thank the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles for inviting me to speak to its members today, and especially to its President, Curtis Mack, about Greece in the new millennium.

 

Today I feel happy because I am given the opportunity to present to you the fundamental considerations of Greece’s foreign policy with its three basic points of reference, namely: our membership in the EU and NATO, our strong bilateral relationship with the United States, and our policies in the areas of our geopolitical vicinity, namely, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.  I will also say a few words about the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.

 

Let me start with Europe, not only for institutional reasons but mainly for sentimental ones.  When Greece signed her association agreement in 1962, with the then -European Economic Community, it was the first European country outside the Community to be provided with such an opportunity. When it acceded in 1981, as the Community’s 10th member. Greece was again the first country of the European southeast and the Mediterranean region to join the EEC since its foundation in 1957.

 

More than 20 years have elapsed since then Greece remains the only EU and NATO country in the area, the most prosperous one, and with a firm commitment and contribution to peace and stability in the broader region.

 

In the meantime Greece, thanks to the efforts of its government and the sacrifices of its people, who had accepted years of austere economic policies, managed to become the 12 member of the Eurozone. Additionally, on 1 January 2002, the Common European Currency, the Euro, replaced our historic national currency, the Drachma. It was an historic step, further affirming the successful integration of our country into the group of the most developed western European countries—members of the E.U.

 

Moreover, Greece assumed, on 1 January 2003, and for the fourth time since its integration in the E.U., the six-month rotating Presidency of the Union. The message we chose for our presidency was the following:  Our Europe – Sharing the Future in a Community of Values.

 

Our message reflected a purpose: to promote a community of values, values which recognize the citizens’ right to security, democracy, and a better quality of life; values which will create institutions guaranteeing their participation and equality; and values which will help the European citizen feel that his or her voice is heard as a member of a new single family.

 

As with every EU Presidency, Greece set a number of priorities it tried hard to successfully promote during its term of office, the most important of these being the enlargement of the EU by including ten new countries—the greatest enlargement in EU history;

 

However, the major challenge that we faced during our Presidency was the Iraq crisis.  To face it, the Presidency undertook a double effort: first, to achieve the maximum possible unity of approach within the Union and among Union members, and secondly, to minimize, in light of the diverging approaches and methodologies between the US and some key EU member states, the adverse effect on the extremely valuable transatlantic relationship.  Both targets were achieved at least partially during the period of the crisis; in subsequent months, and more specifically during the EU-US Summit of last June, which was convened during our Presidency in Washington, DC, on June 25, 2003, we all witnessed a spectacular progress in the so-called transatlantic relationship.  This Summit provided an extremely productive forum for political and economic discussion on major world issues, and it also produced an important number of agreements between the two sides in terms of legal texts and joint declarations, what we usually call “deliverables.” 

 

Let me now leave the European and transatlantic arena and turn to our bilateral relations with the U.S., which are currently characterized by quality, dynamism, and positive future prospects. 

 

To be more specific, I would say that relations between Greece and the United States, which are evolving both bilaterally and within the Atlantic Alliance, always took a prominent position in our foreign policy’s objectives and priorities.

 

The U.S.-Greek relationship can trace its historic and cultural origins to the vast Philhellenic movement that permeated Europe in the first decades of the 19th century. This helped immensely the Greek nation to stage its successful war of independence from the Ottoman Empire and form the first Greek State in 1830.

 

Ever since, this relationship developed dynamically, and it was helped tremendously by a number of factors:  the increasing presence of Greek immigrants to the U.S. since the last decades of the 19th century, the siding of our two countries in all major wars of the 20th century, and the very close strategic cooperation between them that has existed since the end of World War II.  I cannot say that this strong relationship has always been unperturbed and devoid of misunderstandings and disappointments. However, our common values and mutual interests have always had the upper hand.

 

I am happy today to see a bilateral relationship which is characterized by the absence of any significant problems between our two countries. Our relationship is based, and must continue to be based, on trust, common ideals, and commonality of purpose. Our relationship also needs enhanced and enduring dynamism, exploring and exploiting new facets and parameters of cooperation, coordination, and joint initiatives. In this respect, the value of Greece vis-ŕ-vis the US clearly surpasses mere political or geostrategic considerations, which certainly are offered by other countries of the region.

 

Greece’s added value lies exactly where others may have less to offer, namely in its solid system of democratic governance, its strong economy, its open-minded society and its unique contribution to European history and civilization.  Such elements, taken together, render her a historic friend, partner, and ally of the U.S.  Taken together, they provide America with a very good platform for serving both Greek and U.S. interests in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, and the broader region.

 

The Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean constitute Greece’s geopolitical vicinity.  This is the region where Greeks in ancient times lived, fought their wars, cooperated with other peoples, and propagated their language and culture.  In our day all these elements have translated into historic knowledge, human contact and understanding, and a feeling of interdependence in the areas of security and stability, to say the least.

 

The Balkans traditionally have been considered by the Europeans the powder keg of Europe.  In the early ’90s, when both the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia collapsed, the elements of disintegration, ethnic strife, economic backwardness and lack of democratic institutions came suddenly to the surface. What followed is well known and does not need to be repeated today.

 

What Greece felt it absolutely necessary to do, either as part of her national policies or through NATO and the EU, was to work towards devising comprehensive policies for the region.  These policies were designed to address such important issues as the cessation of hostilities between previous ethnic components of the same state, democratization of countries and societies, stabilization measures which included good neighbourliness, inviolability of borders, peaceful resolution of disputes, plain condemnation of terrorism, and so forth as well as economic development programs and infrastructure, integration of the Balkan countries in the Euro-Atlantic structures and, finally, regional politico-economic initiatives.

 

Apart from interventions in all these areas, Greece contributed and continues to contribute heavily to the economic prosperity of these countries, because it believes that political stability without economic development is meaningless. Greece’s efforts in this domain are twofold:

 

First, through substantial Greek private investment in all Balkan countries.  In fact, figures of 2001 indicate that out of a $5.6 billion U.S. dollars total foreign investment in these countries, $2.4 billion was Greek.

Second, through a Greek national plan for the reconstruction of the Balkans amounting to $550 million U.S. dollars over five years – a plan approved by the Greek Parliament and already made available to six Balkan countries through bilateral agreements.

 

Finally, and without entering into details, the last Greek Presidency of the EU presented a specific set of priorities for the Western Balkans, covering five countries, addressing issues such as peace, stability and democratic development, and the carrying forward of the stabilization and association process of the E.U. with these countries.

 

We sincerely hope that the combination of all these national and European efforts will be of crucial importance and will have a beneficial effect on this unstable, volatile part of Europe.

 

The Eastern Mediterranean is an area of historic importance for Greece’s foreign policy. There are two issues that require our continuing attention there: the Cyprus issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both produce tension and instability not only between and among their main players but also to their contiguous geostrategic periphery. As such they continue to adversely affect Mediterranean and European security. Let me say a few words on each of them.

 

There is good news concerning Cyprus’ European future. The European Union decided in December 2002 to include Cyprus in the group of ten countries that will accede to it in 2004.  In fact, the Republic of Cyprus signed the EU Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April of last year.  The integration will take place irrespective of the resolution of the political problem and the artificial division of the Republic of Cyprus following Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974.

 

Cyprus’s European integration, along with the similar one of Malta, constitutes an important milestone for the EU too, which in 2002 decided on a twofold expansion towards the East and the South. But at the same time, Cyprus’s integration constitutes a first move of visionary dimensions concerning a possible exit from the impasse of an unacceptable status quo emanating from years of ethnic strife, foreign military intervention, and the events of 1974 which have caused endless suffering, division and forced displacement and separation of people and families.  We are happy to have seen the U.S. supporting the E.U. integration of Cyprus, also considering it supportive of achieving the resolution of its long-standing political problem.

 

However, despite the positive outlook regarding Cyprus’ European future, its political problem still remains unresolved. Efforts through the UN Secretary General’s good offices to bring about a just, viable and functional settlement have failed, so far, due to Turkish intransigence. The proposal of the UN Secretary General for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem – the so-called Annan Plan – was accepted when it was initially presented in November 2002 by the Greek Cypriot side as a basis for negotiations and possible solution, but was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side. 

 

Very recently, negotiations have resumed under UN auspices in a last effort to resolve the political problem and to permit Cyprus to integrate officially in the EU on the 1 May of this year as a federal state.  This will happen if the two sides, under the auspices of the UN and with the assistance of Greece and Turkey, manage to agree on the basic provisions of the United Nations Secretary - General’s plan by the end of this month.  The open questions will be decided by the United Nations Secretary – General himself and the package will then be referred, through separate referenda, to the two communities in Cyprus for the final yes or no.  The solution must conform to the U.N.S.C. resolutions, which provide for a bi-communal and bi-zonal Cypriot federation with a single legal personality and with the human rights of all its people, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, guaranteed. It is also understood that the arrangement should be in compliance with the European Acquis Group, following Cyprus’s integration into the E.U. 

 

Missing the opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem before 1 May, 2004, would certainly have adverse repercussions on Turkey’s bid to start accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, because everybody knows that Turkey holds the key for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is hardly possible for Turkey to successfully pursue its own European agenda and press for a concrete date to start its accession negotiations leading to its future integration in the E.U. if it does not change its fundamental approach on the problem of Cyprus. It is in fact, occupying a substantial part of the territory of an EU member state by military force.

 

We ,therefore, hope that for a combination of reasons, pertaining not just to Cyprus but also to Turkey’s European aspirations and for broader reasons regarding the future of Greek-Turkish relations, Turkey will support an honorable Cyprus settlement.

 

As far as Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, let me simply say that in recent years we have noticed a marked improvement in a number of areas, such as the economy, culture, illegal immigration, combat against organized crime, and so forth.  In these areas, some 15 bilateral agreements have been signed.  Greece also assists Turkey bilaterally to prepare for her future European integration.  However, the basic points of disagreement emanating from Turkey’s claims in the Aegean remain, and Turkey is under institutional obligation, according to E.U. decision, to refer them to the International Court of Justice at The Hague by the end of this year, in case no solution is found by then, in order to successfully maintain her E.U. integration bid.

 

And I now turn to the second issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict, an issue of great concern to all of us.

 

At the outset, I wish to note that Greece has managed over the years to forge credible links with Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab world in general, through close relations with all countries and peoples in the area.  This allowed us to speak frankly to all sides and to contribute with initiatives in helping defuse the crisis and restart the peace process. As a country with important interests in the area, we feel that a broadening crisis may well damage those interests.

 

We are working nationally, bilaterally, and even multilaterally within the European Union for this purpose.  It is absolutely imperative that the vicious circle of terrorism and violence be stopped, that extremists from whatever side are discouraged and isolated, and that the Palestinian side quickly takes important decisions concerning its internal situation and cohesion and its future political course, and proceeds to institution building and the necessary democratic reforms. 

 

It is crucial that the right of both the Israelis and the Palestinians to live in separate states within secure borders is clearly recognized, implemented and respected, that a full scale mid-term program of economic reconstruction and development for the Palestinians, financed by international sources, is introduced and applied, and that the peace process, aimed at resolving the totality of the problems between Israel and the Arabs, and not just the Palestinians, is revived and given another chance of success.

 

In setting these objectives and priorities, I recognise the need for a step-by-step approach, but within a comprehensive format.  This is exactly the aim of the so-called road map, a plan prepared by the U.S., E.U., U.N. and Russia, to provide a step-by-step approach leading to the resumption of the peace process, the exit from the present impasse, and the gradual establishment of conditions of peace, coexistence, security, stability and development for the area. 

 

I fully understand that these ideas are not new and the sequence of their implementation could undoubtedly play a role. In the past, most of them have been theoretically accepted by both sides. However, when they cautiously started to be implemented, extremism and violence undermined them at their early stages.   The parties directly involved should, this time, approach them with realism and pragmatism.  Other main players like the Americans and the Europeans should not lose sight of the fact that a success story in the Middle East will have far-reaching positive repercussions in areas extending from Southeast Europe to Southwest Asia, to say the least.  All available opportunities should be seized for this purpose.

 

I would like to conclude by saying a few words about the forthcoming 2004 Olympic Games.

 

When Athens was chosen in 1997 to host the Games, winning over Rome in the final vote, it was more than a satisfying win over its competitors.  For Greeks, both at home and abroad, the prospect of the Games returning to the place where they were born nearly 3,000 years ago, and to the city that saw their revival in modern times in 1896, was both an honourable salute and an exciting challenge.  Greeks are excited because they want to host unique Games on a human scale, linking the modern with the ancient by bringing the Olympic movement back to its roots and avoiding the excessive commercialism of recent Olympics.

 

We fully realise what is at stake with these Olympics and how great a challenge we have taken on.  This is a major test of the ability and the image of Greece.   We do not underestimate it, but we feel confident that we will rise to the occasion because no one in the world cares more about the success and welfare of the Olympic movement than the Greeks, who initiated the whole concept. 

 

In closing, let me extend a cordial invitation to all of you to come to Greece to see and enjoy the games, but if this is impossible, there is another solution and that is NBC here in the U.S.  I thank you for your presence and attention.