Over the centuries, millions of immigrants from Europe, among them many Poles, have been seeking a new, better life in America.  A new, truly democratic state was built on the foundations of European tradition and political philosophy.  Gradually, the student became superior to his master.  The freedom and welfare of the United States became an example to progressive Europe.  The Atlantic connected two worlds in the flow of people, goods and ideas.

Flying from Washington to Los Angeles, one can see how vast the United States is.  Today, California is a symbol of wealth and economic prosperity based on advanced high technology.  California, as all of the U.S., on the old continent means dreams that come true.  California represents those features of the United Sates, which fascinate other nations so much.  Here, even the most daring, incredible ideas are realized.  We admire the U.S., not just because it is the greatest power of contemporary times, but also because that might was created for people who are free.

Twelve years ago, Lech Walesa visited California.  Invited by this distinguished institution, he gave a speech as the president of a new Poland.  President Walesa came here as a representative of a country where great, previously impossible, dreams were coming true.  He symbolized the new developments in the history of [Poland] and optimism, which resulted from the fact that the Polish people took responsibility for their country and took its matters into their own hands.

For Poland, a transatlantic relationship is neither an empty slogan, nor an historic concept overtaken by recent events.  It is a living, evolving idea, which is still crucial for international security.  The question is quite simple:  how to prevent anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in America?  To be more precise: for us in Poland the main task within the transatlantic relation is to persuade Americans to stay in Europe.  We in Poland deeply believe that it is in the mutual interest of Europeans and Americans to keep America in Europe, to consolidate our alliance, to be united in front of new threats and challenges.  Transatlantic cooperation does not require theoretical redefinition; however, it requires rather practical transformation and adaptation to the requirements of realities.

The Polish perspective on transatlantic partnership is different nowadays, too, for two main reasons: first, it had another meaning for us in the Cold War.  However, from the moment we regained our sovereignty, it has become one of our guiding principles, underpinning the sovereignty of our country and the security of Poland.  Second, the tragic events of September 11, underpinning the fundamental change in the perception of security threats, have also influenced our thinking on the transatlantic relationship.

It is not just Poland.  It is the entire world community of democracies that has to revisit and reinvigorate transatlantic bonds.  In the past, the transatlantic relationship was based on an overwhelming need to counter a common Soviet threat.  Because of that threat, which was real and imminent, no serious disputes within the transatlantic community were revealed, even if they happened.  The strength of that community was considered to be its unity, even if taken for granted.

What are the prerequisites and challenges for a transatlantic relationship nowadays?  What is its role today?  Does it have a chance to survive the current dispute over Iraq?

Let us try to say in clear terms what the transatlantic relationship should mean today.

It should mean a readiness of Europe and North America to follow a common strategy, not just a common strategy to counter possible threats, but primarily a common strategy to promote common values — human rights, democracy, freedom and a market-oriented economy.

It should also mean a preparedness to harmonize European and American interests, and thus to compromise on unavoidable differences.

It should mean a determination to seek a common security agenda, despite obvious differences in security threat assessments between the U.S. and Europe after the September 11 events.

There is no one single common threat to our security as it was during the Cold War era.  However, we have new assets and foundations upon which we can base the necessary transformation and adaptation of a transatlantic relationship.

The terrorist threat does not, and will not, substitute for the overwhelming security threat from the Cold War era.  It is different in nature.  It is overall in the sense that it may affect everybody.  At the same time, it is specific in the sense that terrorists' targets are unpredictable.  One may say that modern terrorism became democratic.

Many years ago, at the origins of terrorism, the terrorists were [targeting] heads of state, well-known politicians, or royalty.  They believed that if you can do away with some prime minister or king, the world might change.  Modern terrorism, however, targets everybody; no matter what position is taken by their target in political, social and economic life to make this impression bigger.  So from this perspective we have some democratization of terrorism.  We have this common transatlantic cause that deals with grass root causes for terrorism and preventive measures that are very effective tools to fight terrorism.

After September 11, in Poland and Warsaw, we witnessed a very moving event.  The American Embassy in Warsaw was [enveloped] in flowers.  Thousands of candles were lighted around the Embassy; flowers and candles were brought there by ordinary people as their expression of solidarity with America.  A loud “NO” to terrorist activity, and a loud “YES” to fight against terrorism.  This atmosphere is still with us in Poland.  This gives me a mandate as the head of the Polish government to support America and President Bush.  Yesterday when I talked with President Bush and Vice President Cheney I said that America could count on us just as we counted on America throughout the 20^th century.  The basic issue, which will go along with us in our development, will be the development of the European Union and the world.

For years, the U.S. was complaining about a lack of one common telephone number to call Europe.  The U.S. now deals more and more with European partners as an entity, rather than many European partners.  Europe still does not have one uniform view on all issues, including Iraq, but it is undertaking serious efforts with a view to integrating and defining common foreign and security policies.

The current dispute over Iraq is not necessarily weakening the transatlantic relationship.  It is showing that there might be different views within the transatlantic community as to the methods of dealing with a problem.  Nobody is questioning the necessity for Iraq to disarm; there are, however, different opinions as to actual ways and means to achieve that goal.

Let me illustrate my point by referring to a public letter, which I signed together with other colleagues — European prime ministers — a few days ago.  This letter was intended to stress overall unity of views and solidarity of Europe and America.  It was also intended to highlight the need for NATO cohesion in the face of clear security threats coming from unresolved problems in Iraq.  There are some important signatures missing in the letter, but it can be interpreted as meaning that Europeans still lack details of their position on how to deal with Iraq.  We sometimes hear that Europe is divided.  Parts of Europe support the United States; other parts do not.  The support for the United States is needed.  But why is it to be provided by half of Europe, or a quarter of Europe?  It should be the whole of Europe.  Is it possible that a whole Europe will support America's position?  I believe so but we have to work to get it.  I believe that we Europeans will meet on the same point — the same place — as far as the support for U.S. policy is concerned. 

The fact that [Poland] is in this position earlier than others means that we will act for the purpose of having others joining us.  This is why I believe that one may say today that the differences we are talking about are of a technical, and not a strategic, difference.

So we are now facing a dilemma in the situation of what to do when the assessment of a threat is different on two sides of the Atlantic.  Is this unity possible in spite of that?  I believe that, yes, it is possible, and we should concentrate on considering four elements which are very important for an effective transatlantic partnership.

First, it must be based on the notion of solidarity of nations. Poland was benefiting from America throughout the 20^th century, including the first and second World Wars.  We counted on you; you have the right to count on us.

Second, it must be a two-way street.  In other words, it is to be beneficial for all nations involved.  The United States should see mainly political and economic advantages of a cooperative partnership with Europe.  On the other hand, Europe should recognize the political, military and security gains resulting from a cooperative attitude towards the United States.

Third, we cannot challenge the United States’ clear leadership in world affairs.  Equally important, it may not downgrade the position of Europe as an independent international player; an entity in this political [realm].  To put it in simple terms: American leadership, in order to be truly effective, needs to have an embedded mechanism to recognize and respect the interests of others.

Fourth, this unity of interest should have its flexible, but proven institutional expression.  One does not need to reinvent the wheel for that purpose.  We have NATO and the European Union at our disposal.  Enlarging and evolving, the North Atlantic Alliance still offers an excellent framework for transatlantic interaction.  Also enlarging and deepening its internal ties, the European Union is aspiring to the role of the main partner of the United States.

The actual construction of a transatlantic partnership, in order to be stable, needs a solid economic foundation.  American investments in European economy could only be helpful in that regard.  We in Poland hope very much that offset investments, resulting from the Polish governments’ decision to buy the American F-16 Fighter, would help to establish a long-term and strong American economic involvement in my country.

The process of European integration in the long run will help to strengthen such economic foundations of a transatlantic partnership.

Finally, let me stress that the process of globalization constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity for the future of a transatlantic relationship. A challenge because we have to adapt our way of "transatlantic thinking" to the new realities, and an opportunity because globalization necessitates joint action and common attitudes towards international problems.