Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on September 15, 1998:

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Former Secretary of State

"Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era"

As Secretary of State, one of the hard lessons I had to learn was that at a time of crisis, or even at a time of triumph, it is vital not to let yourself become pre-occupied by whatever event is on center stage. The trick is to maintain 360 degree vision -- or at least 360 degree peripheral vision. As one of my predecessors, Dean Rusk, said, at any given moment, two-thirds of the people in the world are awake and a lot of them are trying to make trouble for the United States.

Today, America is focused on domestic matters. We should not permit that preoccupation to cause us to let our guard down on what is happening abroad. So tonight I would like to focus on some of the flash points in the rest of the world - places where we need to be especially alert.

I turn first to Russia. Most of us spent a large part of our adult lives worrying about the Soviets and their nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War brought a moment of exhilaration, as communism retreated and Russia launched a process of political and economic reform. Boris Yeltsin, for all his failings, was by far the most effective exponent of market democracy. On good days and bad, we supported him.

Now we have reached the most dangerous moment for Russia since 199 1. Their economy, is in shambles. Yeltsin, in poor health and disengaged, has lost his clout. By choosing Primakov for Prime Minister, he has placed his own survival ahead of the survival of his policies. The outgoing deputy Prime Minister, Boris Nemtsov, ominously observed a few days ago that the Communist Party is now the governing party.

Let me focus for a moment on Yevgeny Primakov. Bom in the Ukraine of Jewish parents, Primakov adopted the family name of his stepfather to escape the anti-Semitism of Soviet times. He began his working career as a j oumalist, and he served as a Middle East expert under both Presidents Brezimev and Gorbachev. In 1991, Gorbachev named him chief of foreign intelligence and he was the highest ranking Gorbachev official to survive when Yeltsin took over later in the year.

Primakov was widely criticized for his meddlesome and unprincipled efforts to reach a settlement with Saddam Hussein before the Persian Gulf War began. As intelligence chief in the Yeltsin era, he constantly beat the nationalist drums, assailing the United States for not giving enough respect to Russia - what one of my State Department colleagues called "the Rodney Dangerfield syndrome." . In 1996, when he replaced Andre Kozyrev as Foreign Minister, he brought to that position a reputation as a survivor and master manipulator.

I remember the cold February night that year when Primakov and I met in Helsinki in a handsome Finnish guest house. I had asked to meet with him one-on-one so that we could get acquainted without the phalanx of Soviet aides that always accompanied him. With a difficult election year ahead in both countries, I persuaded him to agree on five rules-of-the- road for doing business with me that would avoid surprises for both of us. Primakov agreed, showing that in addition to being a survivor, he's also a pragmatist.

Given the characteristics I've observed, what can we expect of Primakov as Prime Minister? First, we can expect him to demand that Russia be treated as a great power, as an equal on the world stage, however unrealistic that may be. That portends potential big trouble in places like Kosovo, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, where he might well conclude that the atmosphere is right to flex Russian muscle. He's probably shrewd enough not to let his illusions of grandeur get out of control, but it is a real worry.

Second, on the economy, he will probably be working in the treacherous no-man's land between the Communists and the free marketers. His first two appointments were the choices recommended by the Connnunist bloc -- one of them is a Communist who was former head of Soviet Central Planning, and the other is often described as the worst central banker in history. Primakov has signaled that these two appointments were his way of placating the Communists, and he's urged us to be patient. Unfortunately, time is not on Russia's side with its economy in meltdown and hyperinflation just around the comer.

Third, while history is full of surprises, I would expect Primakov to act primarily as a -caretaker, not as an incipient President. Some knowledgeable people describe Primakov as a democrat -- small "d" -- who will keep Russia on the road to market democracy. I am skeptical but would like to be proven wrong. Given all the uncertainty, I regard the best posture for the United States to be one of vigilance and cooperation as Russia moves through this period of turmoil.

The next place on the globe I want to discuss is North Korea. When we entered office in 1993, no problem was more immediately dangerous than North Korea. This remote communist nation is one of the most isolated, repressive, backward and povertystricken in the world. Yet it had found a way to maintain a million man army, and, of greatest concern when we assumed office, to mount a dangerous nuclear weapons program.

In 1994, after months of tough negotiations, we were finally able to reach an agreement under which North Korea committed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program. As our part of the bargain, the United States, together with South Korea and Japan, agreed to provide North Korea with alternative sources for the electric power it would lose by capping its nuclear program.

Today, we are confronted with two puzzling and potentially dangerous developments. First, our intelligence has revealed that North Korea is constructing a huge underground facility near its mothballed nuclear complex. We fear that this is a covert effort to circumvent the 1994 agreement.

Second, two weeks ago, in an attempt to put a satellite in orbit, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that sailed over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. This test demonstrates that North Korea is much closer than expected to developing a longrange missile capable of threatening the United States.

It also means that while the rest of the world is being asked to feed starving North Koreans, their government is spending huge sums -- billions, not just millions -- on programs having nothing to do with feeding its people. It is no wonder that deliberate and responsible diplomats all over the world are beginning to lose patience. Given North Korea's history of unpredictability, this situation bears the very closest watching.

Moving on to western Europe, the situation in the Balkans once again threatens the stability of the continent. This time the flash point is Kosovo, a province of Serbia where 90 per cent of the population is ethnically Albanian and less than 10 per cent is Serb. Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's president, rose to power a decade ago by viciously repressing the Albanians in Kosovo, and he is back at it again. Serbian troops have conducted a reign of terror in Kosovo, forcing the Albanians to flee their homes and villages at gun point. This is a chilling version of the ethnic cleansing so tragically familiar to those who tracked Serb actions in Bosnia. Senator Dole was in Kosovo a few days ago and, in an eloquent colunm in yesterday's Washington Post, he described the situation as far worse than he had expected.

Unfortunately, the ugly violence in Kosovo is not just an internal matter. It has the potential to destabilize the neighboring countries and bring them into the fray. The most immediately affected are Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia, but ultimately our NATO allies Greece and Turkey could be drawn in, as well.

Shortly before I took over as Secretary in 1993, President Bush issued what is known as the Christmas Day warning - a warning that the Serbs would face attack if they caused a conflict in Kosovo. After one month in office, I reiterated this warning. The man responsible for this dangerous and tragic situation is Slobodan Milosevic. We should let him know that the Christmas Day warning has not been forgotten. As we learned in Bosnia, force is the only language that Milosevic understands. And if we threaten him, we have to mean it.

Finally I want to say a few words about the Middle East. Almost exactly five years ago, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn. That historic handshake shattered some of the most profound taboos in the Middle East. For me, the signing ceremony was one of those golden moments that comes rarely in public life.

The launching of the Oslo process produced a series of dramatic breakthroughs including mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO; the May 1994 accord giving the Palestinians self-rule in Gaza and Jericho; and the first Palestinian national elections, which elected Arafat as President.

In recent months, however, the Oslo process has ground to a halt. Despite the heroic work of Ambassador Dennis Ross, the parties have not even been able to agree on how to complete the redeployment under the interim agreement. Even if the parties agree very soon, it will not even come close to putting the Oslo process back on schedule.

Oslo allotted five years -- until May 4, 1994 -- for concluding both an interim agreement and the permanent status talks. As the clock runs down, there is no realistic prospect that the final status talks can be completed before time runs out. I believe an extension of at least two years is necessary if we are to prevent a reversion to hostilities.

Chairman Arafat has promised -- perhaps I should say threatened -- to declare unilateral Palestinian statehood if next May arrives without the conclusion of a final status accord. The hard truth is that a unilateral declaration would be a disaster for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Closing the door on diplomacy would open the door to violence. Israeli settlers would be tempted to vengeance, and Palestinian radicals to terrorism. A newintifada could easily erupt.

Because Israelis and Palestinians are locked in a vicious cycle of recrimination and frustration, American leadership is vital if we are to find a basis for extending the deadline. While the United States cannot want peace more than the parties, there are times when the parties seem to lose track of their most important goals and need outside help to refocus the dialogue. We stand at such a juncture right now. I believe that active U.S. involvement is essential.

Five years ago, on the White House lawn, Yitzhak Rabin gave one of the great political speeches of our time -- or anytime. He began by saying: "This signing .... today, it's not so easy." It was not easy then, and it has become no easier since. The peace process has been strewn with obstacles and traumas. It has continued nonetheless, and it has changed the Middle East in ways that still amaze us. A final reconciliation

would bring a kind of peace that the parties have only dreamt about. The United States should help them reach that dream of reconciliation.

In the brief time I've had with you tonight, I've dealt with four points on the globe that pose the threat of direct and significant impact on U.S. security interests. I could easily have presented a much longer list, discussing for example, our ongoing problems with Iraq and the potential for economic collapse in several regions of the world. Suffice it to say once again, that America cannot afford to focus its attention exclusively on any single matter, whether it be foreign or domestic. The world is simply too complex for its only superpower to suffer from a case of tunnel vision.