Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on November 28, 2000:

His Excellency Hung-mao Tien

Taiwan’s Politics and Security in the Taiwan Strait

It is my great pleasure to be here today. Please allow me to express my deep gratitude to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council for its efforts to make this event possible, and I might add, for the tremendous contributions to international understanding that its work has generated over the years. The vital role of Los Angeles in international affairs cannot be denied, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. We in Taiwan look to you for leadership in so many areas. Thus I am especially excited to have the chance to exchange views with all of you tonight. 

I would like to share with you some thoughts on the current situation and future development of Taiwan, in the wake of the major changes that have been occurring over the past year. In particular, I will focus on the impacts of these changes on the relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s Domestic Environment

First of all, allow me to describe the political situation in the ROC today. I believe many, if not most, of you have been following the news reports from Taiwan in recent months, and you will have seen many references to quote-unquote “turmoil.” This seems to be the new catch-phrase to describe Taiwan. As Foreign Minister, this of course distresses me.

However, I feel this negative impression has been rather exaggerated. Taiwan’s political environment is not as tense as those of many other countries, including unfortunately some of our best friends and neighbors in the Asia-Pacific. To be sure, there are a lot of intense political wrangling and heated debates, but these have been amplified somewhat out of proportion by sensational headlines. You may not know to what extent Taiwan is hooked on TV news -- in addition to the regular news broadcast’s, we have no fewer than five 24-hour news channels. On top of this, the evening programming of many stations, instead of ordinary family entertainment, are dominated by political call-in shows, rather like talk radio in the US. As you all know from your experience here -- and, in this venue, perhaps some of you are real experts -- while these formats are quick and exciting, and they certainly have their role to play, they do not lend themselves to carefully reasoned debate on long-term issues.

And these are exactly what I would ask you to consider today. If we step hack a bit and take a longer view of Taiwan’s politics, I believe we would come to a very different conclusion than the one that we would draw from today’s headlines.

Taiwan’s democratization has come about through an extended process, what is sometimes referred to as a “quiet revolution.” The first stage began after the lifting of martial law. It consisted of the reactivation and amendment of the ROC Constitution, election of all the executive and legislative posts and seats -- the climax of this was the first presidential election in 1996 -- freeing of the press, and a general rebalancing of the structures of power toward the majority Taiwanese population. Of course, these were all enormous achievements, but the fact that the Kuomintang (KMT) remained in power meant that the deep penetration of the party in the political, economic, and social structures of the country remained largely intact. 

The election and inauguration on May 20th this year of President Chen Shui-bian have ushered in the second stage of Taiwan’s democratization. Thus, almost all the conflicts we have been seeing in the news recently -- and, I don’t want to minimize them, some of them are indeed quite fierce -- ought to be interpreted as the outward signs of the second round of growing pains of democratization.

These growing pains are the result of a great many political phenomena now occurring simultaneously that have never before been seen in our country. In the most overarching view, what is happening is the testing and putting into practice of many of the new features of our Constitution.

During the 1990s, the Constitution was amended several times, gradually installing our new democratic system. Some of these changes took effect quite smoothly, for example the direct election of the president. There was quite a bit of debate at one point whether or not to adopt a runoff system, but in the end it was rejected. When former President Lee Teng-hui received 54 percent of the vote in 1996, of course, this was a moot issue. But we are relieved to see that this year, when President Chen received a plurality of 39 percent, only a tiny number of nay-sayers complained “I told you so” -- in fact President Chen ‘s election has been fully accepted as legitimate, which means that this constitutional change has stood the test.

But there are many more changes that have only begun to be tested after President Chen’s inauguration. Most important, and a major cause of headline-grabbing struggles, is the definition of the roles of the executive and legislative branches. The amendments made in this regard were, until now, essentially theoretical -- the KMT, under the strong leadership of former President Lee, controlled all the branches of government in any case, and any conflicts were resolved within the party.

Now, of course, the situation is totally different. The new government has been facing an opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan, and for the first time in history, the ROC government cannot guarantee that its policies, or even the general budget for the administration, can be passed through the legislature.

Will this create a deadlock? If so, how should such a deadlock be resolved? These arc the most basic questions that are vexing Taiwan today. The Constitution spells out a set of basic ground rules, such as the power of the Legislative Yuan to cast a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, the right of the President to select the Premier without approval of the parliament, and the right of recall of the president. But the interplay of these rules has not yet been established clearly. Is the President required to “cohabit” as in the French system? Or should a coalition government be formed? Or a non-partisan ‘government for all the people’? Or can a minority government manage along well enough through ad hoc legislative alliances? All of these scenarios are under discussion right now, and the answers will be hammered out in the political crucible of competing interests under the scrutiny of public opinion.

As if this were not enough, there are many other areas of important change. For instance, Taiwan s political parties are in the process of learning how to adapt to their new roles, and to learn by doing: the Democratic Progressive Party is having to learn how to be a ruling party, the KMT is learning how to be an opposition party, and the new People’s First Party is starting from scratch. Moreover, there is a depoliticization process going on throughout the civil service, the judiciary, and the military after five decades of KMT penetration and domination. They need adapt to an environment where their political masters may shift every few years, and unlearn many of the habits that grew up during one-party rule.

In any case, I continue to be optimistic about the medium and long term in Taiwan. The reason is that all of these processes are necessary steps in democratization process. We have witnessed them in countries all around the world. I understand that recently many people in the US have been reflecting on the political life in the early days of the republic -- I believe there are many parallels between the situation at that time and Taiwan today. A democracy is always a work in progress: people with competing visions of the country will inevitably contend with each other to persuade the people that their path is the correct one.

Therefore, I am confident that what will come out of the current transition period in Taiwan is a stronger, healthier democracy. One reason to be so optimistic is because of the attitude of the people of Taiwan. While pragmatically wishing to ensure stability, they maintain a strong desire for reform. People voted for President Chen primarily for his platform of domestic reform, and that sentiment is still strong. For example, Minister of Justice Chen Ding-nan, leading the fight against corruption, enjoys the very high public approval ratings among the Cabinet.

I would venture that the same basic logic holds in the realm of economics and finance. While the ROC has created the so-called “Taiwan miracle,” and we have established an international powerhouse of information-technology, there are still soft spots, areas that have not yet been reformed, and the government today is addressing them. For example, many key industries, such as telecoms, are still dominated by state-owned enterprises, and the process of privatization is underway. The banking system is being cleaned up, to weed out the influence of cronyism. Many businesses, as well as regulations, are being updated in preparation for Taiwan’s imminent entry into the WTO.

In the financial markets, which have been unstable recently, the government is finally beginning to learn that direct intervention, used extensively in the past, is not beneficial in the long run. Serious discussion is now underway on the role of the government in the financial markets, and I think it is likely that the result will be a more liberal approach.

These trends are intimately bound up with the political transformation that is taking place simultaneously. The clear lesson of the Asian financial crisis is that democracy has emerged as a winner. While a non-democratic regime can make quick moves to discipline speculators and contain a financial crisis, a democracy, with its transparency in policy making and accountability of policymakers is in a better position to make a credible and sustainable commitment to policy reform. This eventually strengthens the economy and keeps it more immune from future crises.

To be sure, policy making in a democracy is not always efficient, as major policy decisions often go through extended legislative debate, lengthy public discussions and sometimes even referenda. However, this short-term economic efficiency loss is more than made up for by higher quality and legitimacy of policy output. A policy process with extensive deliberation and public participation is less prone to mistakes. And policy decisions supported by a wide and democratic consensus help both the government and the private sector to do long-term planning. Some controversial economic policies may change in the wake of an election, but that kind of uncertainty is less detrimental to the economy than the uncertainty caused by the arbitrary exercise of power and the lack of clear rules of the game for leadership succession in non-democratic regimes. Economic management involves not just technical competence but the need for transparency, and sometimes for difficult choices between competing values and goals. The public should have regular opportunities to evaluate these complex and often conflicting dimensions of public policies, and only democracy can reliably provide these opportunities.

Therefore, while the current financial situation may look precarious in the short-term, the weaknesses in Taiwan’s economic systems that are being revealed today did not develop overnight, nor can they be solved instantly. However, going through these adjustment processes will eventually make Taiwan’s economy freer and more robust. One concrete indicator of that long-term potential is that, despite all the negative headlines, foreign direct investment in Taiwan is up sharply this year: by the end of September, it had already reached 5.59 billion U.S. dollars, compared to 4.23 billion U.S. dollars for all of last year. 

Cross-Strait Relations

I believe strongly that in the medium term, there is good reason to be confident that Taiwan will become stronger. The fundamentals are still very good, and improving. For example, in the economic realm, output of Taiwan’s high-tech sector shows no sign of slowing down. In the political arena, we have an increasingly sophisticated and effective civil society.

There is, of course, one key variable that could potentially cast a shadow over this scenario -- the cross-Strait situation.

From the very beginning, President Chen and our administration has spared no effort to emphasize its sincerity and goodwill in reaching out to the PRC. As a democratic nation, Taiwan has no interest in military tensions or conflict; on the contrary, we strongly desire peaceful neighborly relations with Beijing. A stable and peaceful environment in the Taiwan Strait will reinforce these positive developments in Taiwan; on the other band, tension or conflict could destroy all our hard work.

President Chen has himself made this point very clearly. In his inauguration address, he laid out the so-called “five no’s” – “as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan,” his government will not declare independence, will not change the name of the country, will not enshrine the special state-to-state relations” in the Constitution, will not call a referendum to change the status quo, and will not abolish either the National Unification Guidelines or the National Unification Council. Taken together, these statements provide a clear policy framework for the maintenance of the status quo, which should have satisfied those who worried that the installation of a DPP-led government would cause instability.

President Chen has also repeatedly emphasized that we are willing to sit down and talk with the PRC at any time, with no preconditions. The government’s policy is very clear: we do not preclude ally particular outcome of talks, but we insist that any change in the fundamental nature of the cross-strait relations will require the democratic approval of the Taiwanese public. This has also been affirmed by President Bill Clinton, who stated in February that any solution to the Taiwan Strait issue should be peaceful and have “the assent of the people of Taiwan.” These three principles -- no preconditions, no preordained conclusions, and the need for approval by the Taiwanese people -- are not only our policy, but more fundamentally what democracy itself entails. In other words, the process of settling the cross-Strait dispute must conform to democratic principles, otherwise it will not be legitimate or lasting. We believe all democratic states can understand this position.

Many other recent acts of the government, from opening the so-called “mini-three-links” between off-shore islands and the Chinese Mainland to allowing mainland media to post reporters to Taiwan, have added substance to these expressions of goodwill.

I however, until today, we have received no positive response from Beijing. I think we need to ask ourselves, why?

I do not believe that the Beijing leadership is in fact still waiting for some further expressions of goodwill. I find it more plausible that they are now holding off to see whether Taiwan’s political dynamics will continue to turn in their favor. Therefore, we should not naively assume that they will not try to manipulate the domestic political situation to their advantage.

Currently, opposition parties are strongly criticizing the government -- which is their right -- and also trying to push cross-Strait policy in a certain direction. However, we should be concerned about moving too far, too fast. The public is much more cautious, as reflected in the strong support – 80 percent or more in polls, which have been remarkably stable in recent years for maintenance of the status quo.

The risk Today is that some concessions made in haste might be rejected by the public after the fact. This would pose a very serious dilemma, not only in Taiwan, but also for our friends in the US and elsewhere. In other words, I would suggest that, as far as Taiwan’s domestic politics is concerned, the factor that warrants the most careful attention today is not the influence of pro-independence elements, as has often been assumed in the past, but rather the prospect of growing strength of pro-Beijing sentiment. This is something I hope American policymakers will take note of.

But these are just the challenges of democracy, where people are learning bow to be responsible for the nation’s fate: not only the government, but also the legislature, the media, and the voters themselves. We can see already that there is a high degree of engagement, where people are beginning to really sit down and discuss these basic issues. This to me is also grounds for optimism that, after the transition period, the situation, at least from the perspective of Taiwan’s domestic politics, will settle down and become more coherent.

The Role of the US

Although the cross-Strait issue is essentially a bilateral one between Taipei and Beijing, the interests of many countries are involved, not least the US. And the US, more than any other third country, has the ability to have an impact on the situation. Naturally, we expect that the US will continue to play its historic and positive role to help stabilize the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. This in turn, I believe, will enable Taiwan to pull out of its transition period more quickly and more smoothly.

In fact, the lack of trust and confidence on both sides is the main obstacle to improvement of cross-Strait relations. From Taiwan’s point of view, extreme size differences and negative past experiences both contribute to a sense of insecurity. Obviously, negotiations out of fear are unlikely to arrive at a satisfactory result, especially when critical issues of sovereignty are put on the negotiating table

By helping the two sides develop greater mutual trust and confidence, the US can assist the creation of a process of genuine talks. The TRA, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan Policy Review remain the basic framework of US policy toward Taiwan, which has worked so well for many years. Building on this bottom line, there are steps the US can take to improve Taiwan’s confidence.

First of all, the US can support Taiwan to increase its participation in the international arena, including joining more international organizations as well as other international activities. This will help relieve Taiwan’s sense of isolation and insecurity. One successful example so far is the strong US support for Taiwan’s WTO entry -- without unreasonable restrictions. We greatly appreciate these efforts. WTO membership will not only consolidate the liberalization and reform of Taiwan’s economy, it should also have positive spillover effects in the cross-Strait relations, as another forum for interaction between Taipei and Beijing, which should help build mutual trust. I would hope that this could be a model for other such cases.

Second, the US can continue to upgrade military interactions and exchanges, in addition to arms sales, to help maintain a rough balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Naturally, Taiwan’s ability to defend itself is an indispensable element of confidence for any process of negotiations.

Third, we hope the US can be even more proactive to support “track two” initiatives, whether bilateral, cross-Strait, dialogues or multilateral and regional ones such as the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia- Pacific (CSCAP). Since the Taiwan Strait issue directly affects the entire region, it makes no sense to exclude it from the agenda of regional security mechanisms, and therefore Taiwanese involvement is clearly called for.

Conclusion:  Toward a Democratic Peace

We are confident in the continuing support of the United States, not only because this promotes the US national interest, but because our basic principles are in accord with those of the US peaceful resolution of disputes and the assent of the people. In fact I would go farther and assert that these are basic democratic values, which all like-minded people throughout the world -- and they are a growing number -- should uphold.

According to the theory of democratic peace, democracies do not fight each other. However, today nearly half of Asian nations are still not democracies; therefore, the potential for conflict persists. Nonetheless, strong, even brave, efforts are under way in a number of countries, and we are hopeful that the rest of the region will gradually join the global trend of democratization.

The second aspect of the theory of democratic peace is that cooperation among democracies is the key to international stability. As Taiwan consolidates its democratic system, promotion of these shared values of freedom and human rights is becoming a central element of our foreign policy. For example, we are working to engage Taiwan’s vibrant civil society in international affairs; we are also beginning programs to assist democratic development elsewhere. We feel this effort is our basic responsibility as a member of the global community of democracies.

In the process, Taiwan is becoming an ever more important partner for the US and other democracies in the Asia-Pacific region. We look forward to working together even more fully in the years to come to build peace and prosperity. Let us join forces to make the region and the world safe for democracy!  

Thank you.